Utility meter tamper monitoring system and method

ABSTRACT

A method includes activating a tamper monitoring circuit of a security seal configured to securely lock a utility meter. The method also includes wirelessly transmitting an identification data and/or an integrity information associated with the security seal and/or the utility meter to the external transceiver upon activating the tamper monitoring circuit or being queried by the external transceiver through a transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit. The transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and the external transceiver are configured to securely communicate with each other through a secure protocol. Further, the method includes detecting a tamper condition associated with tampering of the security seal through the tamper monitoring circuit, and wirelessly transmitting data associated with the tamper condition to the external transceiver.

CLAIM OF PRIORITY

This is an accelerated examination application and claims priority toU.S. Utility application Ser. No. 12/702,316 titled “UTILITY METERTAMPER MONITORING SYSTEM AND METHOD”, filed on Feb. 9, 2010;

FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY

This disclosure relates generally to security seals for utility metersand, more particularly, to a method, an apparatus, and/or a system of asecure, low-power seal tamper monitoring system.

BACKGROUND

A utility meter (e.g., electricity meter, gas meter, water meter) may beassociated with a physical structure (e.g.,official/residential/commercial building, home). The utility meter maymonitor usage of resources (e.g., electricity, gas, water) therein. Toprevent tampering of the utility meter, a plastic lock may be providedto secure the utility meter. If the utility meter has been tamperedwith, the plastic lock may be compromised (e.g., broken, damaged). Thecompromised plastic lock may be detected during periodic (e.g., monthly)inspection of the utility meter.

The longer the period between consecutive inspections, the greater maybe the likelihood of losses due to the utility meter tampering. As theworld moves toward more intelligent electrical networks, inspections maybe conducted less frequently because intelligent meters may communicateusage directly through a wide area network (WAN). Therefore, utilitycompanies may reduce staff required to conduct physical inspections dueto high labor cost, competition, and/or inefficiencies. Thus, theplastic lock may be comprised for months before being detected. This mayresult in greater exposure to tamper-related financial losses.

SUMMARY

Disclosed are a method, an apparatus, and/or a system of a secure,low-power seal tamper monitoring system.

In one aspect, a method includes activating a tamper monitoring circuitof a seal configured to securely lock a utility meter through areception of a locking portion inside a housing of the seal and/or acommunication through an external transceiver upon secure locking of theutility meter. The reception of the locking portion inside the housingof the seal causes a conductive material of the locking portion tocontact a conductive portion of the tamper monitoring circuit tocomplete an electrical coupling between a power source of the tampermonitoring circuit and the tamper monitoring circuit.

The method also includes wirelessly transmitting an identification dataand/or an integrity information associated with the seal and/or theutility meter to the external transceiver upon activating the tampermonitoring circuit or being queried by the external transceiverfollowing the activation of the tamper monitoring circuit through atransceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit. The transceiver of thetamper monitoring circuit and the external transceiver are configured tosecurely communicate with each other through a protocol configured toenable the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and the externaltransceiver to wait for a period of time when a channel is busy beforeattempting to transmit through the channel or transmit using anotherchannel when the channel is busy.

The channel signifies a frequency in a frequency band of communicationbetween the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and theexternal transceiver. Further, the method includes detecting a tampercondition associated with tampering of the seal through the tampermonitoring circuit, and wirelessly transmitting data associated with thetamper condition upon detecting the tamper condition through the tampermonitoring circuit or being queried by the external transceiver throughthe transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit.

In another aspect, a seal includes a housing, a locking portion, and atamper monitoring circuit. The locking portion is configured to securelylock a utility meter through a reception thereof inside the housing ofthe seal. The tamper monitoring circuit is configured to be activatedthrough the reception of the locking portion inside the housing and/or acommunication through an external transceiver upon secure locking of theutility meter.

The tamper monitoring circuit includes a transceiver configured towirelessly transmit an identification data and/or an integrityinformation associated with the seal and/or the utility meter to theexternal transceiver upon activating the tamper monitoring circuit orbeing queried by the external transceiver following the activation ofthe tamper monitoring circuit. The transceiver of the tamper monitoringcircuit and the external transceiver are configured to securelycommunicate with one another through a protocol configured to enable thetransceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and the externaltransceiver to wait for a period of time when a channel is busy beforeattempting to transmit through the channel or transmit using anotherchannel when the channel is busy.

The channel signifies a frequency in a frequency band of communicationbetween the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and theexternal transceiver. The tamper monitoring circuit is configured todetect a tamper condition associated with tampering of the seal, and thetransceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit is configured to wirelesslytransmit data associated with the tamper condition upon detecting thetamper condition through the tamper monitoring circuit or being queriedby the external transceiver.

In yet another aspect, a tamper monitoring system includes a wirelessnetwork. The wireless network includes a number of external transceiversas gateways thereof and a number of seals associated with each externaltransceiver. The number of external transceivers is configured such thatindividual external transceivers communicate data not only between thenumber of seals associated therewith but also between other externaltransceivers within a mutual radio transmission range.

Each seal includes a housing, a locking portion, and a tamper monitoringcircuit. The locking portion is configured to securely lock a utilitymeter through a reception thereof inside the housing. The tampermonitoring circuit is configured to be activated through the receptionof the locking portion inside the housing and/or a communication throughthe external transceiver associated therewith upon secure locking of theutility meter.

The tamper monitoring circuit includes a transceiver configured towirelessly transmit an identification data and/or an integrityinformation associated with the security seal and/or the utility meterassociated therewith to the external transceiver associated therewithupon activating the tamper monitoring circuit or being queried by theexternal transceiver associated therewith following the activation ofthe tamper monitoring circuit.

The transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and the externaltransceiver associated therewith are configured to securely communicatewith one another through a protocol configured to enable the transceiverof the tamper monitoring circuit and the external transceiver associatedtherewith to wait for a period of time when a channel is busy beforeattempting to transmit through the channel or transmit using anotherchannel when the channel is busy.

The channel signifies a frequency in a frequency band of communicationbetween the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and theexternal transceiver associated therewith. The tamper monitoring circuitis configured to detect a tamper condition associated with tampering ofthe seal, and the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit isconfigured to wirelessly transmit data associated with the tampercondition upon detecting the tamper condition through the tampermonitoring circuit or being queried by the external transceiverassociated therewith.

Further, in another aspect, a resource monitoring system includes aphysical structure comprising one or more utility meter(s) associatedtherewith, a computer network, and a utility payment servercommunicatively coupled with the one or more utility meter(s) associatedwith the physical structure through the computer network. The one ormore utility meter(s) include a seal configured to securely lock the oneor more utility meter(s) and to securely communicate a tamper conditionassociated with tampering thereof to the utility payment server.

The seal includes a tamper monitoring circuit configured to be activatedthrough a reception of a locking portion inside a housing of the sealand/or a communication through an external transceiver associated withthe utility payment server upon secure locking of the one or moreutility meter(s). A transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and theexternal transceiver associated with the utility payment server areconfigured to securely communicate with one another through a protocolconfigured to enable the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuitand the external transceiver to wait for a period of time when a channelis busy before attempting to transmit through the channel or transmitusing another channel when the channel is busy.

The channel signifies a frequency in a frequency band of communicationbetween the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and theexternal transceiver.

The methods and systems disclosed herein may be implemented in any meansfor achieving various aspects, and may be executed in a form of amachine-readable medium embodying a set of instructions that, whenexecuted by a machine, cause the machine to perform any of theoperations disclosed herein. Other features will be apparent from theaccompanying drawings and from the detailed description that follows.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The embodiments of this invention are illustrated by way of example andnot limitation in the figures of the accompanying drawings, in whichlike references indicate similar elements and in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic view of utility meters associated with physicalstructures, according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a schematic view of a seal in the unlocked state, according toone or more embodiments.

FIG. 3 is a schematic view of a seal in the unlocked state, according toone or more embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a schematic view of the seal of FIG. 3 in the locked state,according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 5 is a schematic view of the locked state configuration of the sealof FIG. 3, according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 6 is a schematic view of the equivalent electrical circuitrepresentation of the locked state configuration of FIG. 5, according toone or more embodiments.

FIG. 7 is a schematic view of a tamper monitoring circuit, according toone or more embodiments.

FIG. 8 is a schematic view of a transceiver configured to transmit to anexternal transceiver, according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 9 is a system view of a star topology of a wireless network,according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 10 is a system view of a mesh topology of the wireless network,according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 11 is a system view of a hybrid star-mesh topology of the wirelessnetwork, according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 12 is a process flow diagram detailing the operations involved in amethod of monitoring tampering of a seal associated with a utilitymeter, according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 13 is a schematic view of a utility meter locked using the seal ofFIG. 2, according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 14 is a schematic view of a utility meter locked using the seal ofFIG. 3, according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 15 is an illustrative view of a management console associated withtracking seal tampering, according to one or more embodiments.

Other features of the present embodiments will be apparent from theaccompanying drawings and from the detailed description that follows.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Example embodiments, as described below, may be used to realize asecure, low-power seal tamper monitoring system. Although the presentembodiments have been described with reference to specific exampleembodiments, it will be evident that various modifications and changesmay be made to these embodiments without departing from the broaderspirit and scope of the various embodiments.

Multiple utility meters inside buildings may have multiple sealsassociated therewith. These multiple seals may, in turn, have multipletamper monitoring circuits (e.g., Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)tags) associated therewith. When there is simultaneous transmissionbetween multiple seals and associated tracking units, interference maycause errors/failures in data reception at the tracking units.

FIG. 1 shows a local region (e.g., a street) including a number ofphysical structures 1400 (e.g., buildings) having utility meters 1300associated therewith. In one or more embodiments, the physicalstructures may be residential, official, and/or commercial. FIG. 1 showseach physical structure 1400 as having a single utility meter 1300associated therewith. It is obvious that each physical structure 1400(e.g., an apartment complex) may have a number of utility meters 1300associated therewith, and such variations are well within the scope ofthe exemplary embodiments. In one or more embodiments, each utilitymeter 1300 may have a seal 200/300 associated therewith configured totransmit identification data, integrity information and/or tamperconditions, as will be discussed below.

FIG. 1 also shows the tamper status of utility meters 1300 associatedwith physical structures 1400. A tampered state is shown as T and anon-tampered state is shown as NT. The seals 200/300 are also shown aswirelessly transmitting data to local office 2000. In one or moreembodiments, local office 2000 may be the local office of the utilityservice provider. In one or more embodiments, local office 2000 mayinclude tracking units (e.g., TU₁ . . . TU_(N), 2100 _(1 . . . N))associated therewith configured to communicate with seals 200/300. Thus,in one or more embodiments, wireless communication may occur betweenseals 200/300 and the tracking units.

FIG. 2 shows a seal 200 in an unlocked state, according to one or moreembodiments. In one or more embodiments, seal 200 includes a housing 202configured to receive a bolt 204 therethrough. In one or moreembodiments, bolt 204 may be disposable. In one or more embodiments,housing 202 may include a locking mechanism (not shown) configured tosecure bolt 204 within housing 202 during a locked state. In one or moreembodiments, bolt 204 may pass through elements (e.g., locking hasps) ofa utility meter 1300 before being received in housing 202 in the lockedstate. In one or more embodiments, housing 202 may include a circuitconfigured to communicate identification data associated with seal 200and/or the utility meter 1300 (e.g., electricity meter, gas meter, watermeter) to a tracking unit 2100 _(1 . . . N). In one or more embodiments,the identification data (e.g., unique seal number) may be electronicallyhard-coded into a data bank thereof. In one or more embodiments, theaforementioned circuit (e.g., tamper monitoring circuit 700 to bediscussed below) may also be configured to communicate a “tamper” data(e.g., tamper signal) associated with tampering (e.g., by way ofbreaking bolt 204) of the utility meter 1300 to the tracking unit. Inone or more embodiments, the circuit may be battery powered, and may bearmed when bolt 204 is locked in housing 202 by way of the lockingmechanism.

In one or more embodiments, therefore, provisions to “wake up” thecircuit may be provided through the reception of bolt 204 inside housing202, which may cause a conductive path to be effected between thebattery (or, batteries) and the circuit. In one or more embodiments, thecircuit may be completely inactive prior to the “waking up.” In one ormore embodiments, bolt 204 may be at least partially made of aconductive material and/or may include a conductive material inside aprotective insulation casing.

In one or more embodiments, the circuit may include an interface forprogramming the circuit with the identification data. In one or moreembodiments, once the circuit is “woken up,” the circuit may beconfigured to transmit an encoded signal associated with theidentification information thereof to the tracking unit. In one or moreembodiments, the transmission between the circuit and the tracking unitmay be periodic. In one or more embodiments, the identificationinformation and, hence, the encoded signal, may also be changedperiodically for increased security purposes. In one or moreembodiments, the circuit may include a processor and a memory (e.g.,Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM)), which maybe programmed as described above.

In one or more embodiments, the tampering of bolt 204 may cause thetransmission of the encoded signal associated with the identificationinformation to be disabled, and the circuit may be configured totransfer data associated with the tampering to the tracking unit 2100_(1 . . . N). In one or more embodiments, the tracking unit 2100_(1 . . . N) may be part of the building 1400 in the premises of whichthe utility meter 1300 resides or may be outside the building 1400 butwithin the line of sight (LOS) of the antenna associated with thecircuit inside seal 200.

In one or more embodiments, bolt 204 may have a head 206 configured toaid in locking/unlocking of seal 200. In one or more embodiments, head206 may be removable, and may be made of insulating material. In one ormore embodiments, alternately, head 206 may include conductive materialcovered by an insulation coating. In one or more embodiments, housing202 may be made of plastic, and may be impact resistant. In one or moreembodiments, security seal 200 may also include a locking cap 208configured to lock seal 200 in a state of locking.

FIG. 3 shows a seal 300 in an unlocked state, according to one or moreembodiments. In one or more embodiments, seal 300 includes housing 302,to which a shackle 304 is attached. In one or more embodiments, seal 300may be available to a customer in the form shown in FIG. 3. Alternately,in one or more embodiments, shackle 304 may be available as a separateelement. In one or more embodiments, housing 302 may be configured toreceive the free end of shackle 304 through an inside thereof. In one ormore embodiments, housing 302 may include a locking mechanism configuredto secure shackle 304, which may pass through elements (e.g., lockinghasps) of a utility meter 1300 prior to being received through housing302, in the locked state. Shackle 304, for example, may be drawn tightlyabout locking hasps of the utility meter 1300 to secure the utilitymeter 1300 in the locked state. FIG. 4 shows seal 300 in the lockedstate, according to one or more embodiments. In one or more embodiments,the free end of shackle 304, after being received and locked insidehousing 302, may protrude on an outside thereof, and the tightened stateof shackle 304 may serve to confirm the locked state of the utilitymeter 1300.

In one or more embodiments, housing 302 may include a circuit (notshown) configured to monitor tampering associated with shackle 304. Inone or more embodiments, shackle 304 may be made of an electricallyconductive material. Therefore, in one or more embodiments, thereception of shackle 304 through housing 302 (e.g., through insertion)may arm the circuit, akin to the arming of circuit in seal 200. In oneor more embodiments, shackle 304 may be injection molded, and mayinclude an electrically conductive plastic (e.g., polypropylene,polyamide including electrically conductive carbon particles,polyaniline). In one or more embodiments, shackle 304 may includeelectrically conductive plastic coated with insulating material toshield the system from potential short circuits.

In one or more embodiments, as shackle 304 may include electricallyconductive material, an electrically conductive path is formed betweenconductive terminals inside housing 302, one of which shackle 304 maycontact to arm the circuit discussed above. In one or more embodiments,shackle 304 may be in contact with the other conductive terminal insidehousing 302 in the unlocked state of FIG. 3. In one or more embodiments,therefore, shackle 304 may form an active resistance that may bemeasured as discussed below. In one or more embodiments, the adjustablelength of shackle 304 may be used in monitoring the integrity of seal300.

FIG. 5 shows a schematic view of the locked state configuration of seal300, according to one or more embodiments. In one or more embodiments,the length of shackle 304 between the conductive terminals (502, 504)may be monitored. In one or more embodiments, the terminal to whichshackle 304 may make contact with in the unlocked state may,alternately, be a printed conductor or a direct contact terminal towhich one end of shackle 304 may be soldered. FIG. 6 shows theequivalent electrical circuit representation of the locked stateconfiguration of FIG. 5, according to one or more embodiments. In one ormore embodiments, the portion of shackle 304 between the conductiveterminals (502, 504) may contribute to a resistance R 602. In one ormore embodiments, the coupling of shackle 304 to respective terminals(502, 504) may contribute to capacitances C₁ 604 and C₂ 606. In one ormore embodiments, as shackle 304 may be pulled through terminal 504 torealize the locked state, the length of shackle 304 configured toprovide an active resistance may be varied. In one or more embodiments,when the terminal to which shackle 304 may make contact with in theunlocked state is a printed conductor or a direct contact terminal towhich one end of shackle 304 may be soldered, as discussed above,shackle 304 may be directly electrically coupled to a measuring circuitM 608 or a signal source S 610 (see FIG. 6). Here, there is nocapacitance between signal source S 610 or measuring circuit M 608 andthe resistance R 602, i.e., C₁ 604 is non-existent. Therefore, in one ormore embodiments, the equivalent circuit representation of the lockedstate configuration of FIG. 5 may be an RC circuit whose equivalentimpedance, Z(f), may be expressed in example Equation 1 as:

$\begin{matrix}{{{Z(f)} = \sqrt{\left( {R^{2} + \frac{1}{\left( {2\pi \; {fC}_{2}} \right)^{2}}} \right)}},} & (1)\end{matrix}$

where Z(f) is the equivalent impedance as a function of frequency, and fis the frequency.

In one or more embodiments, assuming that C₂ 606 and R 602 are constant,measurements at two frequencies f₁ and f₂ may be utilized to solve forC₂ 606 and R 602. In one or more embodiments, by measuring Z(f) at twofrequencies, a changing R 602 or a changing C₂ 606 may be monitored. Inone or more embodiments, in order to maximize sensitivity of thecircuit, frequencies f₁ and f₂ may be selected such that

$R = {\frac{1}{2\pi \; {fC}}.}$

In one or more embodiments, the circuit may include a power source(e.g., battery). In one or more embodiments, the circuit may be poweredby an external interrogation device, i.e., the circuit may be passive.In one or more embodiments, the circuit may be semi-passive in that thebattery may be utilized to operate the internal components of thecircuit, and to actively transmit seal 300 status periodically, and theexternal interrogation device may be used to activate (e.g., arm) thecircuit. Therefore, in one or more embodiments, the externalinterrogation device and/or the reception of shackle 304 inside housing302 may activate the circuit. In one or more embodiments, thesemi-passive circuit may aid in the conservation of battery power. Inone or more embodiments, the displacement of shackle 304 may bemonitored, following the arming of the circuit, as the displacementchanges the resistance of shackle 304 and, hence, the length of shackle304 between the conductive terminals (502, 504). In one or moreembodiments, the change in length may also indicate tampering.

In one or more embodiments, shackle 304 may be a cable, one end of whichmay be coupled to another coupling mechanism in the unlocked state. Inone or more embodiments, during reception of the other end of shackle304 (e.g., cable) inside housing 302, shackle 304 may be locked by thelocking mechanism. In one or more embodiments, the other end of shackle304 may then protrude outside housing 302, as discussed above.

In one or more embodiments, the locking mechanisms mentioned above maybe made of robust steel or iron, which, in turn, may be machine or cast.In one or more embodiments, shackle 304 may not be withdrawn in adirection opposite to that of the reception inside housing 302, as thelocking mechanism may prevent shackle 304 displacement in both theaforementioned directions during the locked state.

FIG. 7 shows a schematic view of tamper monitoring circuit 700,according to one or more embodiments. In one or more embodiments, tampermonitoring circuit 700 may be armed by the reception of shackle 304inside housing 302, which may cause shackle 304 to come in contact withconductive terminals (502, 504), whereupon battery 702 is established asthe power source. In one or more embodiments, tamper monitoring circuit700 may include a controller 704 configured to control operations ofcircuit components therein. In one or more embodiments, controller 704may include a processor 772, a non-volatile memory 774 (e.g., anErasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM)), and a volatile memory776 (e.g., Random Access Memory (RAM)). In one or more embodiments,controller 704 may also include a clock (not shown) configured toprovide a time-stamp associated with seal 300 tamper events, andexternal query responses.

In one or more embodiments, tamper monitoring circuit 700 may include atransceiver 708 interfaced with controller 704, and configured to enabletamper monitoring circuit 700 to be queried by an external transceiver710. In one or more embodiments, AC generator 712, which is interfacedwith controller 704, may be configured to generator AC signals atdifferent frequencies. In one or more embodiments, AC generator 712 mayinclude a Pulse Width Modulator (PWM) and a Low Pass Filter (LPF). Inone or more embodiments, PWM may be configured to generate digitalsignals associated with different frequencies, and AC generator 712 maythen be configured to convert the digital signals to sinusoidal waves,whose higher harmonics are filtered by the LPF.

In one or more embodiments, the sinusoidal waves may then be applied atterminal 502. In one or more embodiments, the equivalent impedance,Z(f), discussed above may be the impedance between terminal 502 andterminal 504. In one or more embodiments, terminal 504 may be coupled toa detector 714 (e.g., Amplitude Modulation (AM) detector). In one ormore embodiments, detector 714 may include a diode and a capacitor in asimplest form thereof. In one or more embodiments, the diode may be azero-bias diode or the diode may require a bias level for increasedsensitivity. In one or more embodiments, the AC component of thedetector 714 output may be suppressed through a Low Pass Filter (LPF)716. In one or more embodiments, LPF 716 output may then be fed to anAnalog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) 718 configured to convert LPF 716output to discrete values compatible with processing performed byprocessor 772 of controller 704. In one or more embodiments, volatilememory 776 may be configured to store algorithms associated withanalyzing the abovementioned discrete values and performing otherprocessing described herein.

In one or more embodiments, as discussed above, when shackle 304 isreceived inside housing 302 and contacts terminal 504 through atightening thereof, the tamper monitoring circuit 700 may be armed byway of an electrical coupling being established between the circuitelements and battery 702. Alternately, external transceiver 710 mayissue an arm command to controller 704 following the tighteningdescribed above. It is obvious that tamper monitoring circuit 700 may bearmed internally/externally upon reception of bolt 204 inside housing202 in case of seal 200. Here, the tamper condition may be manifested ina different manner, and modifications therein are well within the scopeof the exemplary embodiments.

In one or more embodiments, transceiver 708, which will be describedbelow, may also be configured to receive the arm command. In one or moreembodiments, external transceiver 710 may have a configuration similarto transceiver 708, and, therefore, the description of transceiver 708will suffice as the description of both transceiver 708 and externaltransceiver 710. In one or more embodiments, as soon as the arm commandis received by controller 704 and external transceiver 710, a referencevalue of R 602 and C₁ 604/C₂ 606 may be measured and stored in volatilememory 776. In one or more embodiments, measurements may be performedperiodically or upon querying by external transceiver 710. In one ormore embodiments, reference values stored in volatile memory 776 mayalso be updated based on slow transitions due to environmentalconditions.

In one or more embodiments, the equivalent impedance, Z(f), may becalculated based on the discrete values read by controller 704(specifically, processor 772) as the output of ADC 718 corresponding tothe signal at different frequencies. In one or more embodiments, the newimpedance value may be compared to a reference impedance valuecalculated during storing of the reference values discussed above. Inone or more embodiments, a tamper event may have an associated increasedchange (e.g., a change above a predetermined value) in the value ofequivalent impedance, Z(f), and may be detected thereby.

In one or more embodiments, controller 704 may also be configured todetermine if shackle 304/bolt 304 has been displaced, following thearming of tamper monitoring circuit 700. In one or more embodiments, asa change in the measured resistance, R 602, may be associated with thechange in length of shackle 304, the change in resistance, R 602, may beutilized in the recognition of tampering. In one or more embodiments,integrity of shackle 304 may be monitored by applying a current throughshackle 304 at two different frequencies. In one or more embodiments, ascurrent at the output of ADC 718 may be proportional to Z(f), twodifferent frequencies may be utilized to solve for R 602, C₁ 604, and C₂606.

In one or more embodiments, tamper monitoring circuit 700 may include atemperature sensor 722 configured to monitor ambient temperature at seal200/300. In one or more embodiments, the ambient temperature may also berecorded therein. In one or more embodiments, in order to account fordrift in Z(f) due to, for example, temperature variations, a mean valueof Z(f) at the two frequencies may be measured and stored at the time ofarming tamper monitoring circuit 700 in non-volatile memory 774. In oneor more embodiments, the mean value may be utilized as a reference valuefor comparison during successive measurements timed by the clock (notshown) programmed into volatile memory 776. In one or more embodiments,depending on the deviation from a predetermined threshold value, atamper alarm condition may be triggered, and an alarm 720 (e.g., audioalarm) may be generated. In one or more embodiments, alarm 720 may becontrolled by controller 704.

In one or more embodiments, temperature sensor 722 may be interfacedwith controller 704, which may be configured to account for both lengthchanges in shackle 304 and diameter changes in shackle 304 due totemperature. In one or more embodiments, the temperature may bemonitored by temperature sensor 722 periodically. In one or moreembodiments, temperature sensor 722 may be configured to ensure that achange in conductivity of shackle 304 is due to a change in temperaturerather than a tamper event. In one or more embodiments, false alarms maybe avoided through the proper utilization of temperature sensor 722.

In one or more embodiments, a set of LEDs 724 configured to becontrolled by controller 704 may provide visual indication of the statusof seal 200/300. In one or more embodiments, a green LED may be utilizedto indicate an armed state, and a red LED may be utilized to indicate atamper condition sensed by controller 704. In one or more embodiments,as discussed above, tamper monitoring circuit 700 may be entirelypassive, whereby battery 702 may be used to operate the internalcomponents of tamper monitoring circuit 700 in addition to periodicallytransmitting status of seal 200/300. In one or more embodiments, thestatus transmission may occur regardless of receipt of an interrogationrequest from external transceiver 710. In one or more embodiments, asdiscussed above, tamper monitoring circuit 700 may be semi-passive, andmay wake up and transmit seal 200/300 status only when activated byexternal transceiver 710. Therefore, in one or more embodiments, thesemi-passive configuration may be preferred for battery 702 power savingpurposes.

In one or more embodiments, in case of seal 200 of FIG. 2, the receptionof bolt 204 inside housing 202 may arm tamper monitoring circuit 700, asdiscussed above. In one or more embodiments, when bolt 204 is insertedinside housing 202, an electrical coupling may be established betweenbattery 702 and tamper monitoring circuit 700, again, as discussedabove. In one or more embodiments, tamper monitoring circuit 700 mayalso be activated through external transceiver 710. In one or moreembodiments, the insertion of bolt 204 inside housing 202 may causecontroller 704 to generate a code associated with a locked seal 200. Inone or more embodiments, transceiver 708 may be configured to transmitthe first code to external transceiver 710. In one or more embodiments,when bolt 204 is inserted inside housing 202, electrical power may beapplied to tamper monitoring circuit 700 at all times. In one or moreembodiments, when bolt 204 is tampered (e.g., by severing bolt 204), asignal in tamper monitoring circuit 700 may be interrupted. In one ormore embodiments, controller 704 may sense this aforementionedinterruption, and transceiver 708 may be configured to transmit a codeindicating a tampered state. In one or more embodiments, controller 704may disable the code generation associated with the locked seal 200.

In one or more embodiments, controller 704 (specifically, processor 772)may be programmed to transmit a “tamper” message through transceiver 708to external transceiver 710. In one or more embodiments, the “tamper”message may be accompanied with an alarm 720, the condition of which mayalso be read by external transceiver 710. In one or more embodiments,once the integrity of seal 200 is breached by way of the alarm conditionbeing read by external transceiver 710, external transceiver 710 maystore the seal identification number of seal 200.

In one or more embodiments, when a number of seals 200 are present(e.g., by way of a number of utility meters 1300 being in a building1400), a number of signals may be transmitted in close proximity. In oneor more embodiments the transmission of a number of signals may requiresecure communication through a protocol, which may “isolate” the signalsfrom one another. In one or more embodiments, care may be taken toensure that no interruption of tamper monitoring circuit 700 may occuronce tamper monitoring circuit 700 is powered ON.

In one or more embodiments, tamper monitoring circuit 700 may bepre-programmed externally through a programming unit (not shown) withidentification data associated with seal 200/300. In one or moreembodiments, once bolt 204/shackle 304 is received inside housing202/302, tamper monitoring circuit 700 program may not be changed.Therefore, in one or more embodiments, bolt 204/shackle 304 may bepermanently locked into the locking mechanism, and removal thereof isnot possible without destroying bolt 204/shackle 304 and/or seal200/300. In one or more embodiments, it may be important that bolt204/shackle 304 and conductive terminal contacts do not disengage due toenvironmental conditions such as unfavorable weather.

In one or more embodiments, external transceiver 710 may be handheld,and may be used to read transmission from transceiver 708. However, inone or more embodiments, external transceiver 710 may, preferably, belocated in a control location associated with the utility meter 1300. Inone or more embodiments, the control location associated with theutility meter 1300 may be at the same building 1400 as the utility meter1300 or at an external location such as the service provider office or asecure non-office location under the purview of the service provider.

FIG. 8 shows a transceiver 708 configured to transmit to externaltransceiver 710, according to one or more embodiments. In one or moreembodiments, as discussed above, the configurations of transceiver 708and external transceiver 710 may be similar, and the descriptionassociated with transceiver 708 will suffice as the descriptionassociated with external transceiver 710. In one or more embodiments, anantenna 782 may be configured to transmit/receive signals associatedwith identification data of seal 200/300, tamper conditions, and/orstatus reports. In one or more embodiments, matching circuit 784 mayserve to match impedance between antenna 782 and the input oftransceiver 708. In one or more embodiments, therefore, matching circuit784 (e.g., balun) may serve to transform the impedance at antenna 782 tothe impedance at the input of transceiver 708.

In one or more embodiments, in the receive mode, transceiver 708 may beactivated/queried by external transceiver 710, as discussed above. Inone or more embodiments, the signal associated with the aforementionedfunctions may be amplified by Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) 806, which maybe configured to suppress noise contributions from succeeding stages. Inone or more embodiments, the output of LNA 806 is converted to afrequency difference signal, or, an Intermediate Frequency (IF) signal,through mixing (through mixer 808) with a Local Oscillator (e.g.,crystal oscillator 830). In one or more embodiments, the output of LNA806 may be mixed to the IF frequency using I and Q mixers. In one ormore embodiments, the frequency difference signal/IF signal may then bepassed through a Band-Pass Filter (BPF) (shown as Frequency Filter (FF)810) in order to allow the IF band of interest to pass. In one or moreembodiments, the output of FF 810 may then be amplified by avariable-gain IF amplifier (shown as IF 812), before being subjected toan analog-to-digital conversion through ADC 814.

In one or more embodiments, digital baseband receiver (DBR) 816 may beconfigured to receive the digitized output (e.g., Quadrature Phase-ShiftKeying (QPSK) signal) of ADC 814, demodulate the digital signal, and tosynchronize the demodulated signal with the preamble of a packetassociated with a transmission protocol (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4) used forthe two-way communication between transceiver 708 and externaltransceiver 710. In one or more embodiments, the preamble (e.g., a bitsequence) may allow synchronization of the receiver data clock to thetransmitter data clock, and may enable further transmission from thenode therein. In one or more embodiments, an automatic gain control(AGC) module (not shown) may adjust the IF gain (analog) (e.g., of IF812) such that the preamble is detected. In one or more embodiments, theIF gain may be fixed during packet (i.e., packets associated with thedemodulated digital signal and the transmission protocol used for thetwo-way communication) reception, following the detection of thepreamble.

In one or more embodiments, DBR 816 may also de-spread the demodulateddata into bit-symbols (e.g., 4-bit symbol), which may be buffered andtransmitted to Receiver Access Control (RAC) module 818 for filteringpurposes. In one or more embodiments, additionally, DBR 816 may beconfigured to provide calibration and control interface to the analogreceiver modules such as LNA 806, and FF 810.

In one or more embodiments, during reception of packets, RAC module 818may be configured to read bit-symbols from DBR 816. In one or moreembodiments, RAC module 818 may be configured to then detect errors inthe digital data (e.g., through a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)). In oneor more embodiments, a Frame Check Sequence (FCS) checker may performthe CRC on the received digital data. In one or more embodiments, RACmodule 818 may then assemble the received digital data for storage in amemory 820 (e.g., RAM) buffer. In one or more embodiments, access may beprovided to memory 820 through a Direct Memory Access (DMA). In one ormore embodiments, additional data may be appended to the end of thepacket stored in the memory 820 buffer in order to provide statisticalpacket information. In one or more embodiments, memory 820 may beinterfaced with controller 704, which may be configured to appropriatelyrespond to queries from external transceiver 710.

In one or more embodiments, non-intended packets may be filtered byhardware inside transceiver 708. In one or more embodiments, a DMAinterface, as discussed above, may be provided to memory 820 in order toreduce interaction with controller 704 during transmission/reception ofpackets. In one or more embodiments, when data denoting identificationdata associated with seal 200/300, status reports, and/or tamperconditions discussed above is ready to be transmitted using transceiver708 (i.e., transmit mode), controller 704 may transmit the appropriatepacket data to memory 820, where the packet data may be stored in thememory 820 buffer. In one or more embodiments, the software stackassociated with the transmission protocol may configure the DMAinterface discussed above by indicating the location of the packet inthe memory 820 buffer. In one or more embodiments, Transmitter AccessControl (TAC) module 822, analogous to RAC module 818, may be configuredto wait for the back-off period, during which the channel (i.e.,frequency desired in frequency band of interest) is busy, and performchannel assessment.

In one or more embodiments, when the channel is clear, TAC module 822may be configured to read the packet data from the memory 820 buffer,perform error detection (e.g., through calculating the CRC), and providebit-symbols (e.g., 4-bit symbol) to the digital baseband transmitter(DBT) 824. In one or more embodiments, TAC module 822 may include a FCSgenerator and a packet retriever for the aforementioned purposes. In anexample embodiment utilizing the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol stack, a CarrierSense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) algorithm maybe implemented and utilized as a component of TAC module 822. In one ormore embodiments, only if a channel is “idle” or is “free,” packet datamay be transmitted to the DBT 824. In one or more embodiments, DBT 824may be configured to spread the bit-symbols, and generate a digitalmodulation signal (e.g., QPSK modulation signal). In one or moreembodiments, the digital modulation signal may be fed to aDigital-to-Analog Converter (DAC) 826 configured to perform theDigital-to-Analog conversion.

In one or more embodiments, the output of DAC 826 may be passed throughfrequency synthesizer 828 configured to convert the baseband signaloutput of DAC 826 to an RF signal. In one or more embodiments, frequencysynthesizer 828 may be a fractional-N frequency synthesizer, whoseinternally generated frequencies are derived from the referencefrequency of crystal oscillator 830. In one or more embodiments, crystaloscillator 830 may serve to generate other reference frequencies fortransceiver 708. However, in one or more embodiments, another crystaloscillator may be utilized to generate, for example, a clock referencefrequency. In one or more embodiments, the output of frequencysynthesizer 828 may be amplified by a power amplifier (PA) 832. In oneor more embodiments, as transceiver 708 is interfaced with antenna 782through matching circuit 784, the signal denoting identification dataassociated with seal 200/300, status reports, and/or tamper conditionsmay then be transmitted to external transceiver 710.

The tamper monitoring circuit 700 may work in a synchronous mode or anasynchronous mode. In one or more embodiments, in the synchronous mode,the clock output of transceiver 708 may be used as the master clock ofcontroller 704. In one or more embodiments, in the asynchronous mode,controller 704 may be configured to generate the master clock thereof.In one or more embodiments, a security engine (not shown) may beimplemented in transceiver 708, whereby security keys may be stored insecurity key buffers of memory 820. In one or more embodiments, securitykeys may include one or more of encryption keys and a decryption key. Inone or more embodiments, the security keys may be utilized to encryptand decrypt frames associated with RAC module 818 and TAC module 822.

In one or more embodiments, all transceiver 708 components, except forthe antenna 782, matching circuit 784, crystal (used in crystaloscillator 830), and capacitors therein may be integrated on a chip. Inone or more embodiments, as seen above, transceiver 708 may be operatedusing controller 704. In one or more embodiments, the transmissionprotocol (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4) may define specifications for low datarate wireless connectivity with portable (e.g., handheld), non-portablebut moving, and fixed devices. In one or more embodiments, thespecifications may be for wireless personal area networks (WPANs). Inone or more embodiments, the implementation of transceiver 708 (and,also, external transceiver 710) may provide for ease of installation,reliable data transfer, short-range operation, and prolonged battery 702life.

In one or more embodiments, in the common scenario of there beingmultiple utility meters 1300 inside a building 1400, all the multipleutility meters 1300 and associated seals 200/300 may come under thepurview of the same utility service provider. Therefore, in one or moreembodiments, in order to avoid interference therein, transceiver 708 maynot transmit automatically. In one or more embodiments, transceiver 708may wait for a period of time before trying to transmit again or maymove to another channel. In one or more embodiments, transmission may beacknowledged in order to provide for improved data reliability. In oneor more embodiments, transceiver 708 and, hence, tamper monitoringcircuit 700 may transmit and receive data based on ZigBee™ technology.ZigBee™ is a data transport technology based on the IEEE 802.15.4standard for WPANs. In one example embodiment, the ZigBee™ technologybased tamper monitoring circuit 700 of seal 200/300 may operateutilizing the 2.4 GHz frequency band. Alternately, in one or moreembodiment, other bands of frequencies may be utilized to operate theZigBee™ technology based tamper monitoring circuit 700 of seal 200/300.

In one or more embodiments, channel selection in a data transport formatmay allow for multiple seals 200/300 (i.e., tamper monitoring circuit700 and, hence, transceiver 708) paired with an external transceiver710. In one or more embodiments, external transceiver 710 may be part ofan asset monitoring unit (AMU), and may be located within the LOS of theantenna 782 of transceiver 708. Therefore, in one or more embodiments,external transceiver 710 may be located in the same building 1400 as theutility meters 1300 or at a location outside the building 1400, asdiscussed above.

In one or more embodiments, other formats such as WorldwideInteroperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX™), WiFi™, and Bluetooth™may be utilized instead of ZigBee™ technology, and such variations arewithin the scope of the exemplary embodiments disclosed herein.

In one or more embodiments, a wireless network including seals 200/300(i.e., transceivers 708) as nodes therein may include externaltransceiver 710 as a gateway. In one or more embodiments, externaltransceiver 710 may be configured to communicate with the nodes (i.e.,transceivers 708). In one or more embodiments, data from a transceiver708 may be transmitted directly to external transceiver 710 and/or viaother transceivers 708. FIG. 9 shows a star topology of a wirelessnetwork, according to one or more embodiments. In one or moreembodiments, external transceiver 710, i.e., the gateway, may beconfigured to send/receive data to/from a number of transceivers 708,whereas a transceiver 708 may only be configured to send/receive datafrom external transceiver 710. In one or more embodiments, externaltransceiver 710 obviously then may have to be within the radiotransmission range of the individual transceivers 708. In one or moreembodiments, the star topology, however, may not be as robust as othernetwork topologies due to the heavy dependence on external transceiver710.

FIG. 10 shows a mesh topology of the wireless network, according to oneor more embodiments. In one or more embodiments, any node (i.e.,transceiver 708) in the wireless network may transmit to any other node(i.e., transceiver 708) therein, provided the other node (i.e.,transceiver 708) is within the radio transmission range. In one or moreembodiments, if a transceiver 708 wants to transmit to externaltransceiver 710 (not shown) or another transceiver 708 that may be outof the radio transmission range, then data associated with thetransmission may be forwarded via an intermediate node (i.e.,transceiver 708). In one or more embodiments, this may provide forredundant and scalable multi-hop communication. In one or moreembodiments, the range of the wireless network may be extended by addingmore nodes (i.e., transceivers 708). In one or more embodiments,however, the power consumption in the wireless network and the time totransmit data may be higher compared to the star topology of thewireless network.

FIG. 11 shows a hybrid star-mesh topology of the wireless network,according to one or more embodiments. In one or more embodiments, thehybrid star-mesh topology may provide for robustness of the wirelessnetwork and low power consumption in the wireless network. In one ormore embodiments, the nodes (e.g., transceivers 708) may not be providedwith the ability to forward data to other nodes (e.g., transceivers708). Here, in one or more embodiments, the nodes may only be configuredto transmit/receive to/from the gateways (e.g., external transceiver710). In one or more embodiments, each gateway (e.g., externaltransceiver 710) may have multiple nodes (e.g., transceiver 708)associated therewith. In one or more embodiments, as the topology mayinclude multiple gateways (e.g., external transceivers 710), individualgateways (e.g., external transceivers 710) may be configured totransmit/receive data not only to/from multiple nodes (e.g.,transceivers 708) but also to/from other gateways (e.g., externaltransceivers 710) within the radio transmission range (e.g., LOS).Therefore, in one or more embodiments, the hybrid star-mesh topologyprovides for increased fault tolerance.

In one or more embodiments, in the hybrid star-mesh topology, utilitymeters 1300 in different buildings 1400 (e.g., neighboring buildings)may be under the purview of the same utility service provider.Therefore, in one or more embodiments, external transceivers 710associated with utility meters in different buildings 1400 maycommunicate with one another. In one or more embodiments, data may thenbe forwarded to a local collection node (e.g., a computer) via thenetworked external transceivers 710. In one or more embodiments, thelocal collection node may then transmit appropriate data to a centralserver having a database to store/index records. In one or moreembodiments, status reports (e.g., tampering condition, history ofoperations performed/tampering with time-stamps of all events) may begenerated at the location of the central server and/or the localcollection node. In one or more embodiments, appropriate actions may betaken based on the data received at the local collection node/centralserver. In one or more embodiments, the actions may include but are notlimited to modifying the customer usage/billing based on therepercussions of the tampering, replacing seal 200/300, and replacingthe utility meter 1300.

For example, seals 200/300 associated with utility meters 1300 may beconfigured to communicate status thereof to a utility payment server.The external transceivers 710, then, may be associated with the utilitypayment server. The utility payment server may be communicativelycoupled to utility meters 1300 associated with physical structures(e.g., buildings 1400) through a computer network.

FIG. 12 shows a process flow diagram detailing the operations involvedin a method of monitoring tampering of seal 200/300 associated with autility meter 1300, according to one or more embodiments. In one or moreembodiments, operation 1202 may involve activating a tamper monitoringcircuit 700 of a seal 200/300 configured to securely lock a utilitymeter 1300 through a reception of a locking portion (e.g., bolt 204/afree end of a shackle 304) inside a housing of the seal 200/300 and/or acommunication through an external transceiver 710 upon secure locking ofthe utility meter 1300. In one or more embodiments, the reception of thelocking portion (e.g., bolt 204/the free end of the shackle 304) insidethe housing 202/302 of the seal 200/300 may cause a conductive materialof the locking portion (e.g., bolt 204/the free end of the shackle 304)to contact a conductive portion of the tamper monitoring circuit 700 tocomplete an electrical coupling between a power source of the tampermonitoring circuit 700 and the tamper monitoring circuit 700.

In one or more embodiments, operation 1204 may involve wirelesslytransmitting an identification data and/or an integrity informationassociated with the seal 200/300 and/or the utility meter 1300 to theexternal transceiver 710 upon activating the tamper monitoring circuit700 or being queried by the external transceiver 710 following theactivation of the tamper monitoring circuit 700 through a transceiver708 of the tamper monitoring circuit 700. In one or more embodiments,the transceiver 708 of the tamper monitoring circuit 700 and theexternal transceiver 710 may be configured to securely communicate witheach other through a protocol configured to enable the transceiver 708of the tamper monitoring circuit 700 and the external transceiver 710 towait for a period of time when a channel is busy before attempting totransmit through the channel or transmit using another channel when thechannel is busy.

In one or more embodiments, the channel may signify a frequency in afrequency band of communication between the transceiver 708 of thetamper monitoring circuit 700 and the external transceiver 710. In oneor more embodiments, operation 1206 may involve detecting a tampercondition associated with tampering of the seal 200/300 through thetamper monitoring circuit 700. In one or more embodiments, operation1208 may then involve wirelessly transmitting data associated with thetamper condition upon detecting the tamper condition through the tampermonitoring circuit 700 or being queried by the external transceiver 710through the transceiver 708 of the tamper monitoring circuit 700.

FIG. 13 shows a utility meter 1300 locked using seal 200, according toone or more embodiments. In one or more embodiments, utility meter 1300may be associated with a building 1400. In one or more embodiments,utility meter 1300 may include a display 1350 configured to displaynumerals associated with customer usage of resources, and a serialnumber 1360 associated therewith. In one or more embodiments, bolt 204may pass through locking hasps of utility meter 1300 to be receivedinside housing 202 of seal 200. In one or more embodiments, this maysecurely lock utility meter 1300. FIG. 13 also shows tamper monitoringcircuit 700 configured to communicate a condition associated withtampering of seal 200.

FIG. 14 shows utility meter 1300 locked using seal 300, according to oneor more embodiments. Here, in one or more embodiments, shackle 304 maypass through locking hasps of utility meter 1300, and the free end ofshackle 304 may be received inside housing 302 of seal 300. In one ormore embodiments, this may securely lock utility meter 1300.

FIG. 15 shows a management console 1500 associated with trackingtampering of seal 200/300, according to one or more embodiments. In oneor more embodiments, management console 1500 may be part of the utilitypayment server and/or the local collection node to which utility meter1300 data may be transferred. In one or more embodiments, managementconsole 1500 may be accessed through an Internet browser, and may serveas a user interface. FIG. 15 illustrates a management console 1500associated with a region/small city. In one or more embodiments,management console 1500 may include a region drop-down menu 1520, fromwhich particular regions (e.g., a street) may be accessed. In one ormore embodiments, addresses in regions may be accessed through addressdrop-down menu 1540. In one or more embodiments, tampered seals 1560 (orutility meters 1300) may then be listed in an order of preference. Forexample, the addresses associated with tampered utility meters 1300 maybe listed, along with the date and extent of tampering.

In one or more embodiments, the drop-down menus may be replaced by alist of all elements. In one or more embodiments, the serial numbers oftampered utility meters 1300 may be accessed through management console1500. It is obvious that modifications of management console 1500 tosuit the volume of data, analysis requirements and/or readability andother variations are within the scope of the exemplary embodiments.

Although the present embodiments have been described with reference tospecific example embodiments, it will be evident that variousmodifications and changes may be made to these embodiments withoutdeparting from the broader spirit and scope of the various embodiments.For example, the various devices and modules described herein may beenabled and operated using hardware circuitry (e.g., CMOS based logiccircuitry), firmware, software or any combination of hardware, firmware,and software (e.g., embodied in a machine readable medium).

In addition, it will be appreciated that the various operations,processes, and methods disclosed herein may be embodied in amachine-readable medium and/or a machine accessible medium compatiblewith a data processing system (e.g., a computer device), and may beperformed in any order (e.g., including using means for achieving thevarious operations). Accordingly, the specification and drawings are tobe regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.

1. A method comprising: activating a tamper monitoring circuit of a sealconfigured to securely lock a utility meter through at least one of: areception, inside a housing of the seal, of a locking portion, thereception to cause a conductive material of the locking portion tocontact a conductive portion of the tamper monitoring circuit tocomplete an electrical coupling between a power source of the tampermonitoring circuit and the tamper monitoring circuit, and acommunication through an external transceiver upon secure locking of theutility meter; wirelessly transmitting at least one of an identificationdata and an integrity information associated with at least one of theseal and the utility meter to the external transceiver upon one ofactivating the tamper monitoring circuit and being queried by theexternal transceiver following the activation of the tamper monitoringcircuit through a transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit, thetransceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and the externaltransceiver being configured to securely communicate with each otherthrough a protocol configured to enable the transceiver of the tampermonitoring circuit and the external transceiver to one of wait for aperiod of time when a channel is busy before attempting to transmitthrough the channel and transmit using another channel when the channelis busy, wherein the channel signifies a frequency in a frequency bandof communication between the transceiver of the tamper monitoringcircuit and the external transceiver; detecting a tamper conditionassociated with tampering of the seal through the tamper monitoringcircuit; and wirelessly transmitting data associated with the tampercondition to the external transceiver upon one of detecting the tampercondition through the tamper monitoring circuit and being queried by theexternal transceiver through the transceiver of the tamper monitoringcircuit.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the locking portion is one ofa bolt and a free end of a shackle, and wherein a non-free end of theshackle is configured to be coupled to the housing of the seal prior toreception of the free end of the shackle inside the housing in thesecurely locked state of the seal.
 3. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising: transmitting at least one of a status of the seal, a queryresponse to a query from the external transceiver, and the dataassociated with the tampering of the seal through a controller of thetamper monitoring circuit to the transceiver of the tamper monitoringcircuit; and routing a query from the external transceiver through thetransceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit to the controller of thetamper monitoring circuit.
 4. The method of claim 3, further comprising:suppressing a noise contribution to an input to the transceiver from acomponent of the transceiver stage through a Low Noise Amplifier (LNA);converting an output of the LNA to a frequency difference signal throughfrequency mixing with a local oscillator in the transceiver stage;transmitting a frequency band of interest through filtering thefrequency difference signal; amplifying the filtered output through avariable-gain amplifier; converting the output of the variable-gainamplifier from an analog format to a digital format; demodulating thedigitized signal through a digital baseband receiver of the transceiver;synchronizing the demodulated digitized signal with the preamble of apacket associated with the protocol utilized for the communicationbetween the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and theexternal transceiver; de-spreading the demodulated digital data intobit-symbols; transmitting the bit-symbols to a Receiver Access Control(RAC) module in the transceiver, the RAC module being configured todetect errors in the digital data; assembling the received digital datafor storage in a memory buffer of the transceiver; and interfacing thememory buffer of the transceiver to the controller, during the receivemode of operation of the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit.5. The method of claim 4, further comprising: transmitting dataassociated with the at least one of the status of the seal, the queryresponse to the query from the external transceiver, and the dataassociated with the tampering of the seal through the controller of thetamper monitoring circuit to the memory buffer of the transceiver;performing channel assessment using the Transmission Access Control(TAC) module, the TAC module being configured to the one of wait for thetime period during which channel is busy and utilize another channel fortransmission; one of reading the data from the memory buffer when thechannel is clear and reading the data from the memory buffer utilizinganother channel, performing error detection on the data, and providingbit-symbols to a digital baseband transmitter through the TAC module;spreading the bit-symbols through the digital baseband transmitter togenerate a digital modulation signal; converting the digital output ofthe digital baseband transmitter to an analog format; transmitting theoutput of the digital-to-analog conversion through a frequencysynthesizer configured to convert the baseband signal output of thedigital-to-analog conversion to a Radio Frequency (RF) signal;amplifying the output of the frequency synthesizer through a poweramplifier; and transmitting the output of the power amplifier throughthe antenna to the external transceiver, during the transmit mode ofoperation of the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit.
 6. Atamper monitoring system comprising: a wireless network comprising aplurality of external transceivers as gateways thereof and a pluralityof seals associated with each external transceiver, wherein theplurality of external transceivers is configured such that individualexternal transceivers communicate data not only between the plurality ofseals associated therewith but also between other external transceiverswithin a mutual radio transmission range, wherein each seal comprises: ahousing; a locking portion configured to securely lock a utility meterthrough a reception thereof inside the housing; and a tamper monitoringcircuit configured to be activated through at least one of the receptionof the locking portion inside the housing and a communication throughthe external transceiver associated therewith upon secure locking of theutility meter, the tamper monitoring circuit comprising: a transceiverconfigured to wirelessly transmit at least one of an identification dataand an integrity information associated with at least one of thesecurity seal and the utility meter associated therewith to the externaltransceiver associated therewith upon one of activating the tampermonitoring circuit and being queried by the external transceiverassociated therewith following the activation of the tamper monitoringcircuit, wherein the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit andthe external transceiver associated therewith are configured to securelycommunicate with one another through a protocol configured to enable thetransceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and the externaltransceiver associated therewith to one of wait for a period of timewhen a channel is busy before attempting to transmit through the channeland transmit using another channel when the channel is busy, wherein thechannel signifies a frequency in a frequency band of communicationbetween the transceiver of the tamper monitoring circuit and theexternal transceiver associated therewith, wherein the tamper monitoringcircuit is configured to detect a tamper condition associated withtampering of the security seal, and wherein the transceiver of thetamper monitoring circuit is configured to wirelessly transmit dataassociated with the tamper condition to the external transceiverassociated therewith upon one of detecting the tamper condition throughthe tamper monitoring circuit and being queried by the externaltransceiver associated therewith.
 7. The tamper monitoring system ofclaim 6, wherein the locking portion is one of a bolt and a free end ofa shackle, and wherein the non-free end of the shackle is configured tobe coupled to the housing prior to the reception of the locking portioninside the housing in the secure locked state of the seal.